**EU CP**

**2NC---AT: EU Fails**

**Strengthening EU’s response will be highly effective.**

James **Pamment** 7-15-20**20**. nonresident scholar in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Associate Professor in Strategic Communication, PhD. "The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation: Taking Back the Initiative". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/15/eu-s-role-in-fighting-disinformation-taking-back-initiative-pub-82286. DL

Amid the coronavirus pandemic, Europe and the West are grappling with a host of thorny dilemmas posed by disinformation and foreign influence operations. While these problems predate the viral outbreak, the public health crisis has certainly exacerbated them. Brussels has taken some steps to meet this set of challenges, some of which are already **paying dividends**.

But there is more that **Europe can do** to make its response **more effective**. Specifically, the EU should formulate **shared terminology** for combating disinformation, assertively **deter adversaries** who are spreading disinformation and conducting influence operations, craft **sensible nonregulatory** interventions to protect online users, and establish an **independent, transparent** auditing regimen for certain online platform functions.

**The EU is best positioned to create a new framework, harden systems, and pursue deterrence.**

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**Misinformation** should be defined as the distribution of verifiably false content without an intent to mislead or cause harm. Countermeasures should be developed from the perspective of **home affairs** and the health of **public debate**, and they should fall under the responsibility of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (DG JUST); the Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content, and Technology (DG CNECT); the Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC); the Directorate-General for Communication (DG COMM); and the Joint Research Centre (JRC).

By contrast, **disinformation** should be defined as the creation, presentation, and dissemination of verifiably false content for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, which may cause public harm. Countermeasures should cover **security considerations**, strategic communications for countering disinformation, oversight of digital platforms, and **research collaboration**, and they **should fall** under the responsibility of the above institutions as well as the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (**DG NEAR**) and the **EEAS**.

Meanwhile, **influence operations** should be defined as coordinated efforts to influence a target audience using a range of illegitimate and deceptive means, in support of the objectives of an adversary. The development of **countermeasures** should be the responsibility of the EEAS, in conjunction with other institutions listed above, in line with its responsibilities for **external relations**, foreign interference, threat **monitoring and analysis**, **resilience building** in the EU’s neighborhoods, and third-country **election monitoring**.

Finally, **foreign interference** should be defined as coercive, deceptive, and/or nontransparent efforts by a foreign state actor or its agents to disrupt the free formation and expression of political will, during elections, for example. The development of countermeasures should be the responsibility of the EEAS, in conjunction with the other institutions listed above, and these countermeasures should emphasize the distinct nature of responses targeting foreign state actors. Integrating such responses with **intel**ligence, **hybrid**, and **cyber** capabilities would also be required for countering influence operations and foreign interference.

**EU solves disinformation --- EAST STRACOM TASKFORCE is effective with overall EU leadership**

**Pamment ‘20**

(James Pamment PhD, Stockholm University, was a nonresident scholar in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.“The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation: Taking Back the Initiative,” pg online @ <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/15/eu-s-role-in-fighting-disinformation-taking-back-initiative-pub-82286> //um-ef)

Amid the coronavirus pandemic, Europe and the West are grappling with a host of thorny dilemmas posed by disinformation and foreign influence operations. While these problems predate the viral outbreak, the public health crisis has certainly exacerbated them. Brussels has taken some steps to meet this set of challenges, some of which are already paying dividends. But **there is more that Europe can do to make its response more effective**. **Specifically, the EU should** formulate shared terminology for combating disinformation, assertively deter adversaries who are spreading disinformation and conducting influence operations, craft sensible nonregulatory interventions to protect online users, and establish an independent, transparent auditing regimen for certain online platform functions. Europe and the West are targets of disinformation, influence operations, and foreign interference. And the responses of most Western countries have been piecemeal and slow, hampered by legal restraints and bureaucracy and lacking in real political understanding of the problem and evidence of its impact. Adversaries include states, organizations, and individuals. They have developed well-established techniques and have laid the groundwork in terms of building networks, disseminating narratives, and tapping into local issues to gain unwitting grassroots supporters for current and future campaigns. This puts the EU and its member states at a disadvantage when it comes to countering these malicious activities. The following factors give adversary actors a significant advantage. Some of them pertain to the nature of the disinformation activities they pursue. These adversary actors often employ low-cost, low-risk, and high-reward tactics. They are first movers and use marginal technological advantages, meaning that their activities can be fully under way before they are noticed. Moreover, they are less restricted by legal, ethical, and bureaucratic constraints, and the broad range of illegitimate influence tools and techniques available to them make it difficult to identify and counteract the full extent of their campaigns. Adversaries also benefit from the limitations and drawbacks of the EU’s approach to date. Targeted countries can often muster only limited political will to acknowledge disinformation and particularly to attribute, punish, and deter adversary actors. In addition, it is easier to craft mitigation plans that focus on a single event, like an election campaign, rather than ones that focus on ongoing public discourse. Moreover, relevant government actors often have limited technical capabilities to monitor, identify, analyze, attribute, and share information about disinformation. Even digital platforms themselves are limited in their capabilities to identify problematic cross-platform behavior. To make matters worse, traditional media often leverage aspects of these influence campaigns in their coverage, unwittingly amplifying central disinformation narratives. Finally, the evidence of harm caused by disinformation and influence operations is patchy, and sufficient evidence for the effectiveness of countermeasures is lacking. In Europe, experts view Russia as the dominant hostile actor currently spreading disinformation. However, the political consensus to attribute these activities to Russia, which was strong in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea and the 2016 U.S. presidential election, has waned.1 Experts regard Russia as having achieved widespread penetration of its narratives in multiple countries across Europe and elsewhere in the world. There is a sense that its deployment of a wide range of narratives implies that it is not sure what will or will not work, and the low cost of such operations affords it a strategy of trial and error. Russia’s scattershot approach to disinformation entails running multiple campaigns simultaneously, with some achieving notoriety while the vast majority of them fail to attract attention from the target audiences or gain traction. Experts express concerns about the extent to which learning from previous successes and failures can increase the efficacy, and therefore the impact, of future Russian disinformation activities. Experts also raise concerns about influence operations run by China. Many view China as Russia’s superior in terms of its potential capabilities and intent to spread disinformation and develop influence campaigns, as well as to coordinate them with broader forms of soft power. Not all its disinformation activities appear particularly sophisticated at present, but experts express much interest in how it might develop and test techniques at home before expanding their reach abroad. However, Western countries have, to date, attributed few influence operations to China. This is due to political concerns rather than a lack of attributable activities. Traditionally known for its cyber capabilities, Iran also poses an increasing disinformation challenge. Smaller authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states like it may increasingly see disinformation and interference, in conjunction with other hybrid activities, as low-cost, high-reward opportunities to achieve limited political goals in EU member states.2 They will likely predominantly aim such activities at their own populations, including through mainstream political parties and their supporters. Disinformation seeded domestically can then be drawn upon as a source for foreign interference. Experts also express increasing concerns that EU member states themselves are becoming a source of misinformation and disinformation. The three papers in this series establish a five-part framework for analyzing influence operations known as the ABCDE framework (actors, behavior, content, degree, effect): Actors: Experts are concerned about Russia and China spreading disinformation, as well as emboldened smaller countries with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments. In addition, they are concerned about political parties and governments within the EU becoming sources of disinformation. Behavior: Experts are concerned about increasingly sophisticated efforts to evade automated detection—for example, by mobilizing authentic digital-platform accounts to engage in inauthentic behavior. Adversary actors will likely boost a greater number of accounts with fewer followers to avoid detection, thereby blurring the lines between authentic and inauthentic and between coordinated and uncoordinated behavior. Experts also anticipate a broader integration of hybrid influence techniques and disinformation. Content: Experts expect grand narratives, conspiracy theories, and rumors (like those currently deployed in disinformation activities) to persist. These will be opportunistic and continue to blur the lines between reasonable expression and harmful content. Use of synthetic content such as deep-text and deepfakes will likely become more common, although technological solutions for identifying synthetic content will likely develop in tandem. Degree: Adversary actors have an increased tendency to produce content on self-hosted websites (including state media–affiliated web platforms) that are then used to spread disinformation on multiple digital platforms. Removal of this content by individual platforms does not affect the source. Adversary actors may use inorganic and semi-organic networks to flood hashtags and search terms to make it harder to access trustworthy information. Paid services for boosting digital platform profiles, in conjunction with existing tools allowed by the platforms, will continue to enable platform distortion. Experts also expect continued microtargeting of content, in conjunction with wider manipulation of public discourse. Effect: Adversary actors will likely continue their efforts to polarize and discredit institutions and prominent individuals, including, in particular, efforts to tarnish trust in nonpartisan actors. Existing societal divisions and current affairs provide a sufficient basis for polarization campaigns. By integrating disinformation with broader hybrid influence campaigns, adversary actors will be able to threaten public health or safety with greater frequency. The second paper in this series discusses the utility and application of the ABCDE framework in greater depth. The framework is useful because it provides a standardized means of collecting, analyzing, and presenting information about disinformation. CURRENT EU POLICY ON DISINFORMATION The EU has taken some actions to counter disinformation and is grappling with how to counter its adversaries in the information space. But its current policy on disinformation is characterized by a lack of terminological clarity, unclear and untested legal foundations, a weak evidence base, an unreliable political mandate, and a variety of instruments that have developed in an organic rather than a systematic manner. The limited successes the EU has achieved so far—in terms of the creation of instruments such as the Code of Practice on Disinformation, the Action Plan Against Disinformation, the East StratCom Task Force, and the Rapid Alert System—have been hard earned. One should not underestimate the challenges posed by the different approaches of member states and EU institutions to the disinformation problem; for example, many member states do not recognize the problem, do not publicly attribute particular malign activities to the offending adversaries, or are under political pressure to limit support to EU-level activities to counter disinformation. Within EU institutions, significant ownership and coordination challenges abound. In this context, the creation of these instruments should be considered a bureaucratic success. However, adversary states can turn this inconsistent approach to their advantage, potentially weakening the processes that are in place and undermining the EU’s countervailing system as a whole. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS Disinformation is a term that defines a policy area but lacks a firm legal basis, though some principles enshrined in human rights–related legislation are relevant. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) enshrine the rights to freedom of expression, to privacy, and to political participation.3 The EU and its member states have the positive obligation to enable an environment where freedom of expression can be enjoyed. Many argue that disinformation and public debate driven by artificial intelligence undermine this fundamental right. Article 10 of the ECHR and Article 19 of the ICCPR make provisions for freedom of expression that protect the right to think and express oneself without interference as well as offer a degree of protection to those who spread disinformation on the same grounds.4 Article 8 of the ECHR and Article 17 of the ICCPR protect the right to privacy, which may be relevant in areas such as the use of personal data to target groups and individuals with disinformation.5 Finally, Article 25 of the ICCPR and Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights codify the right to participate in public affairs and elections, which aspects of disinformation may diminish.6 In all these cases, these fundamental rights are relatively unexplored in relation to disinformation. Some scholarly work has explored whether state-backed information operations may breach international law related to the principle of nonintervention. Others have noted that influence operations that threaten the use of force likely breach Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which explicitly prohibits the threat or use of force.7 The more general principle of nonintervention, which “provides a state with the right to be sovereign within its own territory, free from external interference,” requires that states do not coerce one another in their relations.8 This principle applies most obviously to political expression, particularly in the context of elections. The targeting of critical infrastructure by influence operations, including election systems if they are protected as such by individual member states, should be considered intervention.9 However, political campaigns—and public debate—are unlikely to be covered. Some have argued that the principle of nonintervention also protects the right to self-determination and freedom of thought and, therefore, the right to “the conditions that enable the people to form authority and will and to make free choices.”10 An influence operation can thus be coercive if it “substitutes the authentic process of self-determination with an artificially constructed process in order to generate particular attitudes and results aligned to the intervenor’s will.”11 The right to freedom of thought offers a potential human rights focus on influence operations that could be grounded in a better understanding of manipulation techniques rather than content alone. Additional applications of fundamental freedoms among EU member states specifically include content-related restrictions on expression under private and criminal law, such as defamation, insult, and incitement to hatred or violence. Member states also regulate their respective election frameworks, including rules on political campaigning, campaign finance, political parties, and political advertising. Their relevant bodies of national security legislation are also of relevance in relation to foreign interference. THE EEAS STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION There are two specific divisions within the European External Action Service (EEAS) tasked with assuming various strategic communications responsibilities relevant to disinformation.12 The Communications Policy and Public Diplomacy side leads outreach to EU and external audiences on EU foreign affairs, security and defense, and external action, developing political communications on behalf of the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy. It provides guidance, training, and strategic support to EU delegations and missions/operations. The division also manages communications campaigns, internal communication, social media accounts, and digital platforms as well as public and cultural diplomacy. It does not have a formal role related to disinformation but rather fulfills advocacy and engagement functions for political and cultural EU objectives, including support to all digital media campaigns. The Task Forces and Information Analysis side focuses on the Western Balkans and Europe’s eastern and southern neighborhoods. Its main role is to develop and implement proactive communications activities and campaigns, including political advocacy and initiatives in public and cultural diplomacy for these regions. It provides analytical support for evidence-based communications and policies and has a specific mandate to address disinformation and foreign manipulative interference in the information space through the task forces (see below).13 It is responsible for implementation of the EU’s Action Plan Against Disinformation and the Rapid Alert System (see below) and for the development of future policy in this field. It also has the mandate to support independent media and civil society in the two neighborhoods and the Western Balkans. THE EAST STRATCOM TASK FORCE The EU first addressed disinformation as a matter of priority for security reasons. Following its annexation of Crimea in February 2014, Russia demonstrated disinformation to be a key method of hybrid warfare. In response to representations from a small group of concerned member states, the European Council “stressed the need to challenge Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns” in March 2015.14 This push resulted in the creation of the East StratCom Task Force within the EEAS’s Strategic Communications Division. The task force was established to effectively communicate and promote EU policies toward the eastern neighborhood; strengthen the overall media environment in the eastern neighborhood and in member states, including by supporting media freedom and strengthening independent media; and improve the EU’s capacity to forecast, address, and respond to disinformation activities by Russia.15 Many observers hoped that the East StratCom Task Force would find evidence of how Russian state-sponsored disinformation infiltrated Western media debates and support civil society to push back against it.16 The task force produces a weekly review of pro-Kremlin disinformation targeting the West as a flagship product on the EUvsDisinfo web platform, and its database features over 8,000 examples of disinformation.17 Its team has now grown to sixteen staff members with extensive (but presently outsourced) capabilities in the areas of media monitoring and strategic communications, following three years of funding from the European Parliament. This funding source expires at the end of 2020 and is not renewable. THE EU CODE OF PRACTICE ON DISINFORMATION The EU has also sought to collaborate with private companies to help stem the tide of hostile disinformation. In September and October 2018, it launched a Code of Practice on Disinformation together with roadmaps for implementation from partners in the private sector. Running for a twelve-month trial period (which covered the European Parliament elections in May 2019), the code was an experiment in voluntary self-regulation by the tech industry. Signatories made commitments in five areas: online advertisements, political advertising, integrity of services, transparency for consumers, and transparency for researchers.18 Private sector partners published reports detailing their actions to mitigate disinformation. However, the signatories self-reported their progress, and the information was not verified by an external body. The lessons from this process will feed into further EU policy developments in this area. A recent Carnegie paper details some of the most important lessons from the code process.19 THE ACTION PLAN AGAINST DISINFORMATION In December 2018, the European Commission launched its Action Plan Against Disinformation, which remains a key pillar of EU policy, granting mandates to several operational instruments. This measure placed disinformation within the context of hybrid threats and highlighted the role of strategic communications by the EEAS “as a priority field for further work.”20 The action plan emphasized four areas of work: improving the capabilities of EU institutions to detect, analyze, and expose disinformation; strengthening coordinated and joint responses to disinformation; mobilizing the private sector to tackle disinformation; and raising awareness and improving societal resilience.21 It proposed maintaining the mandate of the East StratCom Task Force and reviewing the mandates of the Western Balkans and South Task Forces.22 The action plan recommended an expansion of their resources and capabilities, as well as the creation of a Rapid Alert System to strengthen coordination among EU institutions, member states, and other relevant international networks. It also proposed initiatives in the areas of strategic communications, media literacy, and high-quality journalism. THE RAPID ALERT SYSTEM The EEAS launched the Rapid Alert System in March 2019 to enable common situational awareness related to disinformation spread across EU member states, as well as the development of common responses.23 The system consists of a rudimentary platform for information sharing, as well as a network of points of contact in the various EU member states. The Rapid Alert System is intended to connect to existing real-time monitoring capabilities inside and outside of the EU, such as the Emergency Response Coordination Centre and the EEAS Situation Room, as well as the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), though this goal has been only partially realized. The system is therefore, in theory at least, an important platform for information sharing from an international perspective. So far, relatively few highly engaged EU member states share information through the Rapid Alert System. Major differences in how member states view the threat of disinformation are reflected in the use of the platform. In particular, a lack of trust between member states has led to low levels of information sharing and engagement. A successful aspect appears to be the networks and relationships formed among small coalitions of like-minded actors. Regular meetings have been held since early 2019, but the system’s alert function had not yet been triggered as of June 2020. ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSIONS EU-affiliated election observation missions also have a role to play. In October 2019, the European Council issued a document titled “Council Conclusions on Democracy,” which observed new challenges to democracy emerging around the world.24 These include the undermining of democratic processes and institutions, low levels of trust, shrinking democratic space for civil society, increased violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and manipulation using online technologies. This last point includes issues of disinformation, hate speech, privacy, and campaign funding. The European Council made commitments to strengthening the EU’s democracy-building capabilities around the world, including promoting instruments created to mitigate the effects of online interference during elections. As a first step, election observation missions of the EU and its member states have been developing a methodology to monitor online political campaigns. In the case of EU missions, this methodology has been road tested in elections in Peru, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia, and it will become a standard part of all future missions. It will, in addition, create a basis for EU support to strengthen research, monitoring, and oversight capacities in third-country academic circles and civil society. THE EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY ACTION PLAN AND DIGITAL SERVICES ACT In addition to the aforementioned measures, the European Commission is also developing two major new policies. First, it is preparing the 2020–2024 European Democracy Action Plan,25 which includes specific commitments to project EU values worldwide.26 This will likely include significant policy commitments at the intersection of disinformation, electoral protection, digital technologies, and public-private partnerships. In this regard, it will set out next steps for building on the Code of Practice and the Action Plan Against Disinformation. Second, building on existing e-commerce rules, the EU is preparing a Digital Services Act.27 Among other things, this measure will set out regulatory powers for the EU over digital platforms, which are likely to include powers of regulation and auditing relating to online disinformation. LESSONS FROM THE CORONAVIRUS Disinformation has been an ongoing threat to the EU during the coronavirus pandemic. The ability of EU institutions to handle this challenge provides a valuable snapshot of the strengths and weaknesses of their current policy instruments. This paper does not analyze the overall EU response to the pandemic but instead concentrates on the lessons relevant to the future of EU disinformation policy. It assumes that the EU continues to grapple with disinformation threats with some distinctive characteristics, as highlighted by multiple sources.28 Actors: Russia and China are running public-image campaigns in the West linked to their overall handling of the crisis, campaigns that have disinformation components. There also have been some limited activities attributed to other state actors such as Iran. Meanwhile, many active criminal groups—some of whom may be state-backed—are taking advantage of the coronavirus pandemic to spread clickbait, phishing scams, and blackmail. Amid the confusion, a wide range of politicians, influencers, and individuals are distributing misinformation and/or disinformation. Behavior: Russia’s and China’s messaging campaigns seek to improve the reputations of their governments by comparing their handling of the pandemic to how Western governments have been handling it, in some cases by falsely representing the actions of the EU and its member states. These campaigns involve coordinated efforts, parts of which are transparently led by official sources such as state media and parts of which are covert. They target multiple pressure points and use tactics beyond disinformation, such as sowing multiple narratives, making payments to online influencers, trolling dissenters, and making diplomatic representations to EU institutions to repress attribution of malign activities. Legitimate public relations activities related to the provision of aid have been accompanied by disinformation campaigns about the actions of the EU and its member states. Furthermore, state and nonstate actors alike are employing hybrid and cyber techniques, in many cases exploiting the public’s coronavirus-related health concerns. Content: There is a broad range of health-related coronavirus disinformation, some of which can be linked to existing long-term, pro-Kremlin disinformation narratives. A great deal of this content is harmful and involves, for example, spreading false health information, attacking the reputations of critical public health institutions, or serving as a pretext for cyber intrusions designed to compromise computer networks. There also have been many conspiracy theories seemingly created to detract attention from the origins of the pandemic and China’s initial handling of it. Degree: There is insufficient evidence to accurately assess the size and scope of the campaigns, but it is clear that at least two major state-backed campaigns are ongoing. They are conducted across platforms and in multiple languages, aimed at a wide variety of domestic and international audiences. Some content is being seeded on state media and other controlled websites prior to distribution on digital platforms in order to facilitate cross-platform distribution and mitigate the effects of removal from platforms. Aspects of these campaigns could be considered within the remit of traditional public diplomacy and soft power, while at times they draw upon communications techniques associated with influence operations. Effects: There are profound health and public safety risks associated with the disinformation connected to these campaigns, as well as to the activities of criminal and hacker groups. These campaigns aim to undermine trust in institutions and to poison the climate of debate. Some aspects of these campaigns demonstrate efforts to erode freedom of thought and expression. Some of these activities also pose emerging short-term and long-term risks to personal, organizational, and national security. The EU institutions were committed to exposing the threat of disinformation during the early phases of the pandemic. However, a lack of coherent policy—for example, in terms of supporting member states such as Italy that were exposed to the virus early on—contributed to an environment in which disinformation could spread more readily. Lacking in clear strategic communications of their own policies at that point, the EU institutions focused on exposing disinformation spread from Russia and misinformation spread by individuals. The focus allowed the disinformation policy area to achieve perhaps its highest-ever profile within the EU institutions, but at the same time this outcome risked politicizing and placing undue pressure on the instruments for countering disinformation. As of early June 2020, the EUvsDisinfo web platform had identified around 570 cases of coronavirus-related disinformation emanating from pro-Kremlin media.29 Simultaneously, in light of the increased political and public interest in disinformation, the EEAS Strategic Communications and Information Analysis Division produced special reports on coronavirus disinformation, which were published on the EUvsDisinfo platform as EEAS special reports. These summarize the research available from multiple international sources and serve as snapshots of findings from the expert community rather than independent research conducted by the EEAS.30 Subsequent leaks of these reports, and the decision to produce separate public and internal versions, demonstrate the ad hoc nature of the processes by which these documents were created. The details of the most serious leaks, which relate to alleged Chinese pressure on the EU to change the third report, are not discussed here.31 Some immediate recommendations tailored to various relevant actors for the future of EU disinformation policy are outlined below. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION Formulate tailored responses to state-sponsored disinformation: Disinformation touches on many different policy areas. When dealing with adversarial state actors, disinformation policy responses should be tailored specifically to deter the particular country or actor in question by altering their strategic calculus in a coherent, coordinated (For more information, see the third paper in the series, “Developing Policy Interventions for the 2020s.”) Troubleshoot issues that arose in the recent response to Chinese disinformation: China is not a new disinformation actor, and the StratCom task forces had already recruited a China specialist prior to the outbreak of the pandemic. Furthermore, use of diplomatic representations to assert pressure is a standard means of pushback used by actors accused of disinformation by the EU and its member states, including Russia, and this tactic is sometimes part of broader hybrid influence campaigns. Commissioners should review the information-sharing structures that exist between them and the EEAS to better understand why their stance toward Chinese disinformation lacked preparedness in this instance. Commissioners should review which other state-based disinformation actors could provoke similar challenges in the future by, for example, including their staffers on joint training, red-team drills, and risk-assessment exercises. Take a long-term view and anticipate the future trajectory of disinformation campaigns: The coronavirus pandemic is likely to continue in some form or another for several months and possibly years. Risk assessments for the next stages of the crisis should focus on proactive intervention to address the vulnerabilities in current societal debates. For example, the development and global rollout of a vaccine is likely to be exploited by disinformation actors, including state-backed actors. Offer appropriate backing to bodies tasked with responding to disinformation: Attribution to state actors always requires a clear political mandate—institutions such as the EEAS need political protection if they are to attribute publicly, so as not to be vulnerable to pushback from actors who are publicly shamed. However, research and monitoring teams need to be able to report on what they are seeing, accurately depict the views of the broader scientific and intelligence communities, and speak truth to power. Commissioners and the EEAS should agree on language around attribution in EEAS special reports and on the EUvsDisinfo web platform. (A suggestion on how to do this is outlined in the second paper in this series, “Crafting an EU Disinformation Framework.”) Develop new, more nuanced terminology for disinformation: Part of the controversy surrounding attribution is a product of current EU disinformation policy not being fit for purpose, not least because the term “disinformation” is used as a catchall to cover a range of influence activities. New terminology is required to add nuance and precision to EU policy. (A suggestion to that end is outlined in the second paper in this series, “Crafting an EU Disinformation Framework.”) Be transparent and supportive of actions taken to combat disinformation: Public statements by the spokesperson for European Commission Vice President for Values and Transparency Věra Jourová, High Representative Josep Borrell, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen have not served the staff or journalists working on these reports well.32 Given the personal risks associated with analyzing the disinformation of hostile foreign actors, commissioners should demonstrate to staff that personal safety is highest on their list of priorities. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EEAS STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION Clearly demarcate the origins of EEAS-linked analytical reports: There should be a clear distinction between work produced by the EEAS’s task forces according to their monitoring and analysis methodologies and its special reports that summarize and assess the findings of the international research community and governments. Special reports should be framed as all-source research and open-source intelligence analysis. They should follow a common and systematic framework, and each statement should be linked to the source and, where possible, to a degree of confidence in those findings. The overall assessment of the EEAS should be clearly demarcated from the all-source summaries. (A proposal framework is outlined in the second paper in the series, “Crafting an EU Disinformation Framework.”) Create a secure way for reports to be revised: The issuance of internal and public reports has created confusion, not least because both are unclassified. The EEAS needs a secure process by which to gain political approval from the European Commission for its assessments in the special reports when such a step is appropriate. This process needs to ensure revisions can be made without the risk of leaks, so that a single report can be amended without the need to create separate versions. However, this political process should only impact the EEAS’s overall assessment of all available evidence, not the all-source research and open-source intelligence summaries. Fully utilize the Rapid Alert System: While the Rapid Alert System was used to share reporting among EU member states, an alert related to the pandemic has not yet been triggered.33 Given the threat to public health that coronavirus disinformation represents, this seems like a missed opportunity. The system remains an underused resource that solves coordination and information-sharing problems between the EU institutions and member states in theory, but it has not performed a significant role in practice. The EU should further analyze why the Rapid Alert System has not fulfilled its potential during this crisis. Adopt a more strategic role: The Strategic Communications Division has been proactive in becoming a hub for reporting on coronavirus disinformation among the EU institutions. This role also needs a strategic angle; for example, this could entail conducting risk assessments for short- and medium-term disinformation threats and sharing these with the institutions and member states. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EAST STRATCOM TASK FORCE Insulate EUvsDisinfo analysis from day-to-day politics: The EUvsDisinfo platform should be kept separate from other forms of EEAS analysis. It currently has a disclaimer stating that it does not represent official EU policy, and it should retain this arm’s length distance to protect its work from day-to-day political pressures. Double down on EUvsDisinfo’s mission and methods: The identity of the EUvsDisinfo platform should be strengthened with a clearer statement of its goals, research methodologies, and political mandate. It should be strengthened so it can represent its results as products of rigorous monitoring and analysis methodologies, rather than judgment calls that can be swayed by political considerations. A clear statement of purpose and methodologies should also help the platform avoid accusations of mission creep and bias, and such a statement would allow the wider research community to better engage with its methods and results. AN EU DISINFORMATION POLICY FOR THE 2020S An approach for the next stage of EU policy on disinformation—particularly with respect to the European Democracy Action Plan— is outlined below. It defines a way ahead and lays out the main options that should be considered to meet future threats. It rests on four pillars, which build on the principles described above and create a coherent stance fit for the current and near-future threat landscape. The four pillars are: A new approach to terminology: developing EU-specific terminology and a disinformation framework and delegating responsibility for different terms and areas of work to specific EU institutions; A new assertiveness: formulating proactive methods for deterring adversaries from spreading disinformation and conducting influence operations and manipulative interference; A new consultative process: crafting nonregulatory interventions that enhance the ability of digital platforms to protect users from disinformation; and A new regulatory regime: establishing independent auditing of key elements of platform functions with a differentiated approach to data transparency. The EU should first revise the terminology used to support disinformation policy and analysis to make it easier to distinguish between different aspects of the problem. Disinformation is currently used as a catchall term that does not help the EU institutions define different areas of problematic behavior. It muddles the actions of individuals inadvertently sharing incorrect information with the hybrid influence campaigns of hostile states. A first step is therefore to create a rigorous framework designed to define the scope of the challenge and assign responsibilities. The second paper in this series proposes terminology and a framework capable of systematizing the EU institutions’ disinformation work, which is briefly outlined below. TERMINOLOGY AND FRAMEWORK Four terms should become authoritative definitions preferred by all EU institutions in their engagements with stakeholders: misinformation, disinformation, influence operations, and foreign interference. The benefit of differentiating terms is to align democratic concerns—such as freedom of expression, data transparency, and privacy—with the concerns of national and European security, including around elections. To resolve these tensions, the paper recommends using terminology that reflects institutional ownership of various policy areas. Misinformation should be defined as the distribution of verifiably false content without an intent to mislead or cause harm. Countermeasures should be developed from the perspective of home affairs and the health of public debate, and they should fall under the responsibility of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (DG JUST); the Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content, and Technology (DG CNECT); the Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC); the Directorate-General for Communication (DG COMM); and the Joint Research Centre (JRC). By contrast, disinformation should be defined as the creation, presentation, and dissemination of verifiably false content for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, which may cause public harm. Countermeasures should cover security considerations, strategic communications for countering disinformation, oversight of digital platforms, and research collaboration, and they should fall under the responsibility of the above institutions as well as the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) and the EEAS. Meanwhile, influence operations should be defined as coordinated efforts to influence a target audience using a range of illegitimate and deceptive means, in support of the objectives of an adversary. The development of countermeasures should be the responsibility of the EEAS, in conjunction with other institutions listed above, in line with its responsibilities for external relations, foreign interference, threat monitoring and analysis, resilience building in the EU’s neighborhoods, and third-country election monitoring. Finally, foreign interference should be defined as coercive, deceptive, and/or nontransparent efforts by a foreign state actor or its agents to disrupt the free formation and expression of political will, during elections, for example. The development of countermeasures should be the responsibility of the EEAS, in conjunction with the other institutions listed above, and these countermeasures should emphasize the distinct nature of responses targeting foreign state actors. Integrating such responses with intelligence, hybrid, and cyber capabilities would also be required for countering influence operations and foreign interference. This terminology is escalatory. Foreign interference can involve several influence operations. Influence operations can include many examples of disinformation. Disinformation can cause or be derived from misinformation. Institutional ownership should be developed on this understanding; for example, the EEAS would be responsible for countering disinformation spread by pro-Kremlin sources on the grounds that such disinformation is part of influence operations and a tool of foreign interference. ACTOR-SPECIFIC APPROACHES The benefit of this approach is that misinformation and disinformation are treated primarily as problems of democracy to be dealt with by improving the health of public debate, while influence operations and foreign interference are treated as security concerns in the context of attempting to influence the calculus of adversary actors. This approach also acknowledges that actor-specific knowledge is a necessary foundation of the disinformation debate. The third paper in the series, “Developing Policy Interventions for the 2020s,” outlines the main options for action, which are summarized below. Reshape adversaries’ strategic calculus: The EU should consider its interventions from the perspective of denying adversary actors the benefits of their actions in addition to domestic concerns such as data transparency. Interventions should be designed to influence adversaries’ calculus so that they no longer perceive disinformation, influence operations, and manipulative interference as beneficial courses of action. Leverage strategic communications and public diplomacy to dissuade adversaries from using disinformation and influence operations: **Some current EU instruments, such as** the EEAS’s Strategic Communications Division and **the East StratCom Task Force, make strong contributions to developing societal and institutional resilience**. Modern, data-driven strategic communications and public diplomacy are central to maintaining and projecting these capabilities. To further develop their potential, EU policymakers should reconsider how these elements contribute to a cumulative posture aimed at dissuading adversary actors from spreading disinformation and conducting influence operations and manipulative interference. Situate disinformation responses in broader geopolitical strategies: EU policy toward Russia, China, and other identified adversary actors should be assertive in integrating disinformation-related concerns into its broader engagement posture. Policymakers should consider regulatory and nonregulatory interventions related to disinformation not merely from a data-transparency perspective but also from a geopolitical perspective. Raising costs, denying benefits, and denying capabilities should be core motivations driving policy interventions. Actor-specific capabilities should be augmented where appropriate by integration with intelligence, hybrid, and cyber resources. REGULATORY AND NONREGULATORY INTERVENTIONS The third paper in the series, “Developing Policy Interventions for the 2020s,” outlines a range of regulatory and nonregulatory measures that should be developed into a coherent, comprehensive EU disinformation policy. Nonregulatory measures are particularly important, as digital platforms have multiple tools at their disposal for modifying user behavior. Building on the results of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, the EU should work with and better support platforms in establishing guidelines on best practices that set clear standards of responsible platform behavior aligned with fundamental freedoms. The paper details several examples where EU guidance on areas such as terms of service, terminology, promoting/demoting content, political parties, and research collaboration could be beneficial to current and emerging digital platforms, member states, and the international community. The paper suggests the following: Design nonregulatory measures through stakeholder dialogue: A range of nonregulatory interventions should be developed on the basis of a collaborative, iterative, and recurring format for policy and operational dialogue among different parts of the stakeholder community. Craft guidelines relevant to the full range of policy actors: Guidelines should be developed in multiple areas to provide support and direction to stakeholders seeking to mitigate the impact of disinformation, including digital platforms, member states, civil society, and researchers. These would represent best practices and would set expectations for the broader stakeholder community. The European Commission will likely favor regulatory interventions, particularly in areas where the voluntary code of practice fell short of delivering the desired results. The paper on policy interventions outlines an overall approach to regulation that places the onus on digital platforms to fulfill a duty of care, while enabling independent verification of their results. It suggests a differentiated approach to data access, on the grounds that data transparency should be viewed as a means of improving policymaking, not as an end in itself.34 This approach includes the following tasks. Establish a regulatory environment involving reporting by and auditing of digital platforms: The EU should establish a regulatory process based around three steps: a statement of expected outcomes, a reporting mechanism for digital platforms, and an auditing mechanism for independent verification of results. Encourage collaborative, cross-sector research: The EU should support collaborative models of cross-sector research and information sharing to enable analysis of data made available by digital platforms, in support of the public interest and sound policymaking. Consider regulations for addressing social media manipulation: The EU should explore regulatory interventions into the market for social media manipulation, including demonetization of disinformation. Delineate duties and consequences clearly: Definitions of digital platform responsibilities and the consequences of breaches should be clearly defined. Such definitions should maintain a focus on improvement, learning, and iterative development of evidence-based policymaking. The overall package of policy recommendations presented here is designed with a view not just to solving European problems but rather to creating a default global disinformation policy for democracies to adapt to local conditions. The recommendations promote evidence-based policymaking based on a logical alignment between terminology, interventions, and empirical data. They balance concerns about fundamental freedoms with security and distinguish between the types of problems that disinformation entails and the types of actors that it involves. Interventions are designed to reframe the issue in terms of influencing the calculus of adversary actors so that they no longer perceive disinformation and interference as a beneficial course of action.

**2NC---AT: US Deficit**

**US follows on. They’ve historically been the leader.**

Annina **Claesson** April 20**19**. former researcher with the CSIS Europe Program. "Coming Together to Fight Fake News: Lessons from the European Approach to Disinformation". CSIS. https://www.csis.org/coming-together-fight-fake-news-lessons-european-approach-disinformation. DL

Reviewing the European Union’s new initiatives provides several positive lessons on how to design policy responses to disinformation that **go beyond tech**. Due to the rapid development of the technology behind disinformation campaigns, there remains a significant risk that the European Union’s response will lag be- hind the latest tools. Disinformation has **a social dimension** as well as a techno- logical one, and any effective policy must take a holistic approach. In 2018, the European Union took **many important steps** in this regard. Through improved **interagency coordination**, measures to **regulate** the private sector, and support for **media literacy**, the European Union is now **on a path** to build resilience against disinformation ahead of the 2019 elections.

That is not to say that there is not room for improvement. The mixed success of the EU vs Disinfo campaign illustrates the difficult balance between involving a diverse network of stakeholders and “outsourcing” information defense operations to the point where they become unreliable. **Rigorous monitoring** and **evaluation** is crucial as a part of the process of improving cooperation between sectors. Civil society has already provided counsel to the European Union in this regard: civil society should be **directly involved** in monitoring and evaluation in order to **improve accountability**.

Reviewing the European Union’s policies **provides an opportunity** for countries like the United States to draw lessons to inform **their own** multi-stakeholder strategies to counter disinformation. **While** the United States does not operate under the same legal framework as the European Union, the logic behind the European Union’s raised ambitions to counter disinformation should certainly still apply **across the pond**. Perhaps most importantly, the “**European approach**” highlights the necessity and difficulty of involving all parts **of society** in this fight. In 2018, the European Union has made **landmark progress** particularly in addressing the private sector and protecting personal data. The effectiveness of measures such as GDPR and the Code of Practice must be carefully evaluated both within and outside of the European Union. The United States would **greatly benefit** from reviewing the results of such an analysis to inform future policy conversations about whether to implement **similar measures**.

The disinformation challenge has always changed with the times and will con- tinue to do so. Learning from each other—on an interagency or **transatlantic basis**—remains the **best way** of staying ready to counter it.

**They set the global standard for fighting disinformation. Empirics prove.**

**AP 4-23**-2022. Associated Press. "EU law targets Big Tech over hate speech, disinformation". NPR. https://www.npr.org/2022/04/23/1094485542/eu-law-big-tech-hate-speech-disinformation. DL

BRUSSELS — Big tech companies like Google and Facebook parent Meta will have to **police their platforms** more strictly to better protect European users from hate speech, disinformation and other harmful online content under **landmark EU legislation** approved early Saturday.

European Union officials clinched the agreement in principle on the Digital Services Act after lengthy final negotiations that began Friday. The law will also force tech companies to make it easier for users **to flag problems**, ban online ads aimed at kids and empower regulators to punish noncompliance with **billions in fines**.

The Digital Services Act, one half of **an overhaul** for the 27-nation bloc's digital rulebook, helps cement Europe's reputation as the **global leader** in efforts to rein in the power of social media companies and other digital platforms.

"With the DSA, the time of big online platforms behaving like they are 'too big to care' is coming to an end," said EU Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton.

EU Commission Vice President Margrethe Vestager added that "with today's agreement we ensure that platforms are held accountable for the risks their services can pose to society and citizens."

The EU **continues to set** the **global standard** for bridling Big Tech

The act is the EU's **third significant law** targeting the tech industry, a notable contrast with the U.S., where lobbyists representing Silicon Valley's interests have largely succeeded in keeping federal lawmakers at bay.

While the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission have filed major antitrust actions against Google and Facebook, Congress remains politically divided on efforts to address competition, online privacy, disinformation and more.

The EU's new rules should make tech companies more accountable for content created by users and amplified by their platforms' algorithms.

The biggest online platforms and search engines, defined as having more than 45 million users, will face extra scrutiny.

Breton said they will have plenty of stick to back up their laws, including "effective and dissuasive" fines of up to 6% of a company's annual global revenue, which for big tech companies would amount to billions of dollars. Repeat offenders could be banned from the EU, he said.

The tentative agreement was reached between the EU parliament and the bloc's member states. It still needs to be officially rubber-stamped by those institutions, which is expected after summer but should pose no political problem. The rules then won't start applying until 15 months after that approval, or Jan. 1, 2024, whichever is later.

"The DSA is nothing short of a paradigm shift in tech regulation. It's the first major attempt to set rules and standards for algorithmic systems in digital media markets," said Ben Scott, a former tech policy advisor to Hillary Clinton who's now executive director of advocacy group Reset.

The need to regulate Big Tech more effectively came into sharper focus after the 2016 U.S. presidential election, when Russia used social media platforms to try to influence voters. Tech companies like Facebook and Twitter promised to crack down on disinformation, but the problems have only worsened. During the pandemic, health misinformation blossomed and again the companies were slow to act, cracking down after years of allowing anti-vaccine falsehoods to thrive on their platforms.

Under the EU law, governments would be able to ask companies take down a wide range of content that would be deemed illegal, including material that promotes terrorism, child sexual abuse, hate speech and commercial scams. Social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter would have to give users tools to flag such content in an "easy and effective way" so that it can be swiftly removed. Online marketplaces like Amazon would have to do the same for dodgy products, such as counterfeit sneakers or unsafe toys.

These systems will be standardized to work the same way on any online platform.

Germany's justice minister said the rules would safeguard freedom of speech online by ensuring sites can be made to review decisions on deleting posts. At the same time, they'll be required to prevent their platforms being misused, said Marco Buschmann.

"Death threats, aggressive insults and incitement to violence aren't expressions of free speech but rather attacks on free and open discourse," he said.

Tech companies, which had furiously lobbied Brussels to water down the legislation, responded cautiously.

Twitter said it would review the rules "in detail" and that it supports "smart, forward thinking regulation that balances the need to tackle online harm with protecting the Open Internet."

TikTok said it awaits the act's full details but "we support its aim to harmonize the approach to online content issues and welcome the DSA's focus on transparency as a means to show accountability."

Google said it looks forward to "working with policymakers to get the remaining technical details right to ensure the law works for everyone." Amazon referred to a blog post from last year that said it welcomed measures that enhance trust in online services. Facebook didn't respond to a request for comment.

The Digital Services Act bans ads targeted at minors, as well as ads based on users' gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation. It also bans deceptive techniques companies use to nudge people into doing things they didn't intend to, such as signing up for services that are easy to opt into, but hard to decline.

To show they're making progress on limiting these practices, tech companies would have to carry out annual risk assessments of their platforms.

Up until now, regulators have had no access to the inner workings at Google, Facebook and other popular services. But under the new law, the companies will have to be more transparent and provide information to regulators and independent researchers on content-moderation efforts. This could mean, for example, making YouTube turn over data on whether its recommendation algorithm has been directing users to more Russian propaganda than normal.

To enforce the new rules, the EU's executive Commission is expected to hire more than 200 new staffers. To pay for it, tech companies will be charged a "supervisory fee."

Experts said the new rules will likely **spark copycat regulatory** efforts by governments in **other countries**, while tech companies will also **face pressure** to roll out the rules **beyond the EU**'s borders.

"If Joe Biden stands at the podium and says 'By golly, why don't American consumers deserve the **same protections** that Google and Facebook are giving to **Europe consumers**,' it's going to **be difficult** for those companies to deny the application of the same rules" elsewhere, Scott said.

**1NC/2NC --- EU Space Solvency**

**EU is a space leader --- Space programs boost international influence and domestic economic prosperity**

**Robinson and Ramancov ‘14**

(Jana Robinson is a PhD Candidate at the Institute of Political Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague. Dr Michael Romancov is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Studies, Charles University, “The European Union And Space: Opportunities And Risks,” pg online @ <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/EUNPC_no-37-1.pdf> //um-ef)

Space has become an essential domain for strengthening the capacity of the European Union (**EU) to advance domestic prosperity and gain international influence**. Space policy and spacerelated cooperation have developed into an essential component of foreign and security policy-related planning and decision-making. Europe has joined a number of spacefaring states in the competition to derive greater civilian, societal, commercial and military benefits from its presence in space**. The EU now has a defined role in space-related endeavours.** As Article 189 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (as amended by the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon) gave the EU, for the first time, explicit competence for space. As effective operations in space require cutting-edge technologies, large-scale funding, and multi-year support, the EU has been working with its member states, the European Space Agency (ESA) and its international partners to create a coherent EU space policy and a systematic programme for its implementation. This strengthened cooperation within the EU and beyond is founded on the principle of the peaceful uses of outer space and encourages greater transparency and trust among state and nonstate actors in space. In February 2013 the European Commission presented five main objectives for an EU space policy: 1. Establish a coherent and stable regulatory framework 2. Further develop a competitive, solid, efficient and balanced industrial base in Europe and support SME [small- and medium-sized enterprises] participation; 3. Support the global competitiveness of the EU space industry by encouraging the sector to become more cost-efficient along the value chain; 4. Develop markets for space applications and services; 5. Ensure technological non-dependence and an independent access to space.1 Many space systems are dual-use in nature (i.e. for both civilian and military applications). Accordingly, the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) should play important and appropriate roles in influencing the overarching framework or architecture for future space activities. As the CFSP is within the purview of the EU member states and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (assisted by the European External Action Service, EEAS), it has important implications for the strategic nature of space assets and their contribution to the security and prosperity of the EU and its global standing. One indication of the important role of space assets from an EU perspective has been the sustained investment in developing three space programmes: the European global navigation satellite systems—European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) and Galileo—and the earth observation programme Copernicus. As the EU has invested heavily in space systems, it is appropriately concerned with the need to strengthen space security, including through the adoption of a normative framework for space activities. The primary goal for the EU is to achieve a safe, stable and sustainable space environment that is embedded in a multilateral framework of space treaties, guidelines and principles that reflect and codify a multilateral consensus on what a broad architecture for space activities should include. **The EU has also underscored the need to acquire the necessary tools to protect space infrastructure,** and at several Council meetings EU member states have called for the development of a space surveillance and tracking (SST) system.2 In December 2011 the Council called for future operational capability at the EU level in the field of space situational awareness (SSA) with 3 segments: ‘surveillance and tracking of orbiting objects, prediction and monitoring of the space weather phenomena and their effects in particular on critical infrastructure and Near Earth Objects (NEOs), within the definition of an SSA capability, founded on the approved aggregation between civil and military SSA user requirements’. To that end, the European Commission has proposed an organizational framework to establish and operate an SST system at a European level that combines the existing assets and expertise of EU member states with possibly new EU capabilities to be developed. Today’s more complex, congested and competitive space environment requires new approaches to the management of space, going beyond those envisioned even a few years ago. Given the ongoing dynamic changes in the space environment, the final design of an EU space policy, and the eventual global governance framework, must be agile enough to respond to a broad array of contingencies in near real time. The EU takes into account initiatives put forward in international forums—including the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which is the UN’s specialized agency for information and communication technologies—to address a number of pressing space-related issues. Such issues include dangerous orbital debris, avoidance of destructive collisions, the crowding of satellites in geostationary orbit, the growing saturation of the radio frequency spectrum, as well as threats posed by intentional human disruptions. In addition to agreed rules, transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) have been proposed as elements of a number of these proposals. Taken together, the proposals call for the serious involvement of all spacefaring and aspirant countries, as well as non-governmental and commercial entities, to advance a safer, more secure and sustainable outer space environment.

**2NC --- EU Autonomy**

**EU space autonomy is good and key to the net benefit.**

Daniel **Fiott** 12-7-20**20**. Security and Defence Editor, EU Institute for Security Studies. "The European space sector as an enabler of EU strategic autonomy". European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/653620/EXPO\_IDA(2020)653620\_EN.pdf. DL

The European Union (EU) **can be proud** of what it has achieved in space over the past few decades, and space is a domain where the EU has pressed its **strategic autonomy**. Despite initial doubts and suspicions by close partners and perhaps even some EU member states, the EU forged ahead with its own space objectives and today it can boast Copernicus as one of the **leading** earth observation systems. Galileo, after only an initial service of 2 years, has 1 billion users worldwide and the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) helps augment this. Yet, it is too easy to become complacent. The EU must **strive to ensure** that it matches political and financial **commitment** to its ambitions in space, and this means also ensuring that Europe’s space sector stays at the **technological frontier** and forging a **common vision** for EU space strategy. This is especially true during the pandemic where there is a potential risk of financial underinvestment, production delays and supply disruption. Strategic autonomy in space may be lost more easily than it was achieved.

This study looks at the ways in which the European space sector can be an enabler of EU **strategic autonomy**. It asks how should the EU understand space and strategic autonomy, what has the EU achieved in space and how this has contributed to the EU’s strategic autonomy and what more is needed to enhance it. After looking at the growing geopoliticisation of space, a shifting market structure and new space technologies, this study argues that the EU could gear its space endeavours to two trends that are **growing in importance**. First, space is a geopolitical realm that is increasingly dominated by the United States, **China and Russia** and they are increasingly investing in space for national **security** concerns as well as economic **competitiveness**. Second, space is a technological frontier and the space sector is presently subject to rapid technological shifts marked by quantum computing and communications advances, nano technologies, advanced manufacturing and robotics and Artificial Intelligence (AI).

This current geopolitical context demands that the EU **reframes** how it sees its role in space – it lacks a **coherent strategic** approach and **vision** between EU institutions and member states. This means that questions about the EU’s readiness and willingness to engage in space from a security and defence perspective **are legitimate**. In this regard, this study makes three broad recommendations to ensure that the EU can continue to enjoy strategic autonomy in space. First, the need for persistent public investments to advance launcher and satellite technologies, ensure a greater European physical presence in space through more missions, to initiate a new EU satellite constellation flagship project for extensive and high-speed broadband coverage and the technological advancement of Galileo. Second, a need to harness the power of new technologies such as advanced launchers, nano satellites and quantum communications backed up by investments, technology roadmaps and supply chain security in order to enhance the EU’s digital transformation, connectivity, **resilience** and non-dependence. Third, to plan for **geopolitical competition** and space by developing more space-defence **dual-use** capabilities at the EU level and anchoring them in clearly articulated military requirements. The EU could use the “**Strategic Compass**” initiative to spell out clearly what defence-space capabilities the Union requires in a context where space and earth is congested with **geopolitical rivalry**.

**2NC --- US-EU Coop**

**Collaboration with the US is successful, and the EU has experience.**

**DOS 6-29**-2022. the best department. "United States Hosts U.S.– EU Space Dialogue". United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/united-states-hosts-u-s-eu-space-dialogue/. DL

As part of our deep ongoing collaboration on outer space issues, officials from the United States and the European Union met for the **11th U.S.-EU** Space Dialogue in Washington, D.C. Officials discussed cooperation on Earth observation and disaster response, global navigation satellite systems, spaceflight safety and **s**pace **s**ituational **a**wareness, and opportunities for trans-Atlantic cooperation to ensure the **security** and **long-term sustainability** of outer space activities. The United States and the European Union have a **long history** of space cooperation, including collaboration on applications of U.S. Global Positioning System and EU’s Galileo system and the use of Earth observation satellites to support action on **climate change**, a shared priority.

**2NC --- EU is a Space Leader**

**EU space dialogue solves space Cyber Security --- leadership boosts EU autonomy**

**Pellegrino et al ‘16**

(Massimo Pellegrino and Gerald Stang at the EUISS, and the ultimate responsibility for its content lies exclusively with them, “Space security for Europe,” pg online @ <https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/Report_29_Space_and_Security_online.pdf> //um-ef)

As the threat landscape evolves, closer engagement between the space and cyber communities will need to become permanent. **In the EU, this connection can be enhanced by bringing space actors into the EU cyber dialogue to identify common risks and define appropriate solutions**, even though the exchange and disclosure of vulnerabilities is highly sensitive. **Stress tests to assess and improve resilience to potential cyber attacks can also become a regular practice**, along with the development of formal processes to identify and compensate for when space systems or services have been compromised. Space personnel will need to be continuously re-trained on protecting and recovering the systems, software, data, and devices they use. As the responsibilities and competencies of European space actors have increased, their need for independent supporting capacities has expanded. Reliance on commercial providers raises questions about how to balance the needs for system control, reliability, bandwidth availability, security, flexibility and affordability. Reliance on other actors comes with additional risks for both member states and European institutional users. One tool for managing these risks could be a permanent cooperative process to research the costs and benefits of relying on commercial partners or a single non-European provider for information and capacity in particular programmes. **Having autonomous and cutting-edge capabilities for space access, earth observation, communications, and navigation and positioning can help strengthen European autonomy of action**. This work will need to go hand-in-hand with investments in training and skills enhancement.

**2NC --- EU SSA Devp**

**EU-led SSA program can supersede U.S.-led program --- ensures SSA and STM effectiveness**

**Strickings ‘19**

(Alexandra, Research Fellow, Space Policy and Security, RUSI, “The Future of EU–US Cooperation in Space Traffic Management and Space Situational Awareness,” pg online @ <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/08/future-eu-us-cooperation-space-traffic-management-and-space-situational-awareness-0/summary> //um-ef)

Nevertheless, the EU’s tradition of support for openness and civil society means that it is well placed to fill the gaps in the other extant SSA systems by being independent, open and free at the point of service. **An EU-led open system**, with the option for other providers to feed in their data if they wanted to, **could rapidly supersede the US SATCAT as the system of choice by virtue of its open availability**, and **with relatively modest investment**. Such a system could also be best placed to increase international cooperation with countries such as Japan and India as well as smaller countries looking to responsibly operate their limited assets and contribute to broader space sustainability. The EU can also look to support and promote initiatives such as the Space Data Association (SDA)33 and the DARPA-led Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations (CONFERS),34 which provide forums for international operators to exchange data and cooperate to avoid collisions.

**And, that provides incentives for U.S. to provide more cooperation and data**

**Strickings ‘19**

(Alexandra, Research Fellow, Space Policy and Security, RUSI, “The Future of EU–US Cooperation in Space Traffic Management and Space Situational Awareness,” pg online @ <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/08/future-eu-us-cooperation-space-traffic-management-and-space-situational-awareness-0/summary> //um-ef)

The broad landscape of SSA activities and their importance for orbital sustainability, as well as the changing operators and policy, mean that there are a number of opportunities for EU–US cooperation, **and for the EU to increase its capabilities and become a key player in leading the responsible use of space**. The one area in which potential opportunities will be very limited, if not impossible, is military SSA activities. International involvement in the US CSpOC is limited to the UK, Canada and Australia, all members of the Five Eyes community, as well as France and Germany. Any possible involvement of additional European countries would only occur as the result of a larger intelligence and information sharing partnership, although US Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein has stated that he expects the CSpOC to continue to grow.31 The EU should therefore focus on the civilian aspects of SSA and the changing landscape of providers. It has been suggested by a number of experts that SSA needs to become a civil mission with the military augmenting and supporting national security programmes as their mission. That will need a significant shift in US operations (**which is happening slowly) and a greater sharing of data.** Data integrity and data trust are essential. **The concept of the EU SST as a civil programme should provide the required momentum to help with this paradigm shift**. However, some important issues need to be addressed to support this. First, the civil programme should be the primary goal. Second, EU funds need to be focused on developing sensors, capabilities and experience that complements and contributes to existing activities rather than replicating what is currently available. For Europe that means not spreading funds and resources across a number of countries but focusing on only one or two to support the rest of Europe. Third, sensors dedicated to STM are essential, as one of the difficulties in space tracking for the military is that many of its sensors are primarily focused on missile defence. Fourth, cooperation among EU contributors needs to improve and this must be rectified before Europe can provide an effective support mechanism for global SSA. As a multilateral organization, the EU SST framework also comes with its own set of challenges in cooperation and information integration between member states. It can look to the EU Satellite Centre (Satcen)32 in Torrejon, Spain, as an example of understanding and dealing with the sensitive nature of aggregating national derived data and distributing it among EU member states.

**And, EU can develop and coordinate international space coop --- building SSA capabilities key**

**Pellegrino et al ‘16**

(Massimo Pellegrino and Gerald Stang at the EUISS, and the ultimate responsibility for its content lies exclusively with them, “Space security for Europe,” pg online @ <https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/Report_29_Space_and_Security_online.pdf> //um-ef)

The complex governance of European space activities will not easily be rationalised into a common framework any time soon. But with a common vision and good communication, major governance changes are not necessarily required in order to pursue effective action on space security. **Building trust among all space institutional actors can be facilitated through the creation of shared and common European policies and strategies**, rather than just EU ones. A common European strategic approach to space security can provide a pillar around which institutions, member states, and industries can articulate their own policies and activities. Such a common approach could help ensure the inclusion of space security priorities, such as resilience, space sustainability, and effective data policy, within broader space strategies and security strategies. **This would also facilitate the joint development of both technical and diplomatic proposals to tackle and address space security challenges**. **One key element** to monitor space risks is the development of Space Situational Awareness (**SSA**) capabilities for which Europe still depends on the US for detailed information. The EU has recently set up a Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) support framework involving an open consortium of member states to network existing SST assets and provide anti-collision alert services at the European level. **Further development of SSA capabilities would allow Europe to better respond to the full range of threats originating in the space environment**. Closer cooperation on space security can also be envisaged between the civil and military domains, taking advantage of what each group has to offer without necessarily reorganising the governance arrangements for European space systems. Integrating the potential for dual use by both civil and military actors into future space programme development can help concretise this cooperation. As the number of private space actors and the services they provide continues to expand, a framework for enabling private sector exploitation of space could prove useful, including a review of the regulatory bottlenecks and gaps facing new space entrants in Europe. Incentivising security-conscious behaviour by private companies and other new space actors, as well as reducing the significant uncertainties and costs regarding insurance, financing and liabilities can facilitate commercial activity in space.

**2NC --- EU Space Dialogue Solves**

**And, the EU can develop space dialogue involving the international actors --- creates cooperation and effective space policies**

**Pellegrino et al ‘16**

(Massimo Pellegrino and Gerald Stang at the EUISS, and the ultimate responsibility for its content lies exclusively with them, “Space security for Europe,” pg online @ <https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/Report_29_Space_and_Security_online.pdf> //um-ef)

To systematically improve cooperation among European actors on space security matters, mechanisms for regular exchanges can be established, both within Europe and in its external relations. For example, a European Space Diplomacy Network composed of individuals from the EU, the ESA, and member states (perhaps modelled on the existing Green Diplomacy Network) could help pursue shared priorities and coordinate action plans for space diplomacy. European effectiveness in pushing forward a space sustainability agenda can also be enhanced when European space actors unilaterally implement space sustainability measures. Such action may include, for example, a public and independent review of how the EU, ESA and member states are applying agreed voluntary measures. It will also be important to bring some space security issues into bilateral dialogues, complementing multilateral cooperation efforts at the UN. In particular, this can involve deeper connections with the United States, who due to their increasing awareness of their vulnerability in space have been led to focus more on diplomatic approaches to enhancing space security. Dialogue cannot be limited to like-minded partners, however. Russia and China can be difficult dialogue partners, but they are still essential for shaping the space environment.

**General EDT Solvency**

**EU programs are analogous to NATO --- can do all of the same things as the aff**

**Christie ‘22**

(E. H. Christie, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” European View 2022, Vol. 21(1) 13 –2 //um-ef)

In the EU context, the EDA plays a central role in several areas of work. Among other activities, the **EDA supports defence research cooperation, defence standardisation and pooled procurement programmes**, while also contributing to the EU’s Capability Development Plan and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (Fiott 2018, 287). **Most of the EDA’s functions are broadly analogous to ones that exist at NATO.** **Of particular interest is the intention to create a new Defence Innovation Hub within the EDA,** as announced in the EU’s November 2021 draft Strategic Compass (European External Action Service 2021, 23).

**Global Solvency/Standards**

**Only the EU can create global solvency**

**Bradford 20**, the Henry L. Moses Distinguished Professor of Law and International Organization at the Columbia Law School. (Anu, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World, pp. 25-26)

Only large economies can become sources of global standards. However, market size alone does not vest a jurisdiction with global regulatory power—or else the “Washington Effect” or the “Beijing Effect” would likely exist alongside the Brussels Effect. Instead, unilateral regulatory power requires distinct political choices made by a large economy. The EU has become a global regulator not only because of the size of its internal market, but also because it has built an institutional architecture that has converted its market size into a tangible regulatory influence. The key stakeholders in the EU have further embraced stringent regulation as a key toward a better society, giving the critical political backing for an ambitious regulatory agenda. However, the EU does not exert global regulatory power over any policy area it desires—market forces successfully globalize some EU regulations but not others, setting limits on the Brussels Effect. This chapter lays the theoretical foundation for the Brussels Effect. It identifies the conditions for, and the mechanism through which, the externalization of one jurisdiction’s standards unfolds. A careful examination of unilateral regulatory authority suggests that there are five elements underlying the Brussels Effect—market size, regulatory capacity, stringent standards, inelastic targets, and non-divisibility. Existing literature focuses on market size as a proxy for the jurisdiction’s ability to exercise regulatory authority over foreign entities.1 Large market size is, indeed, a precondition for unilateral regulatory globalization. Yet the jurisdiction must also possess sufficient regulatory capacity to exercise global regulatory authority. This entails having in place institutional structures that are capable of adopting and enforcing regulations effectively. In addition, these regulatory institutions must promulgate stringent regulatory standards, reflecting the preferences of key stakeholders in the jurisdiction. A global regulatory authority is also tied to a choice of regulating inelastic targets such as consumer markets as opposed to more elastic targets such as capital. Only stringent standards aimed at targets that cannot flee the jurisdiction ensure that a country’s regulations will not be constrained by market forces or other jurisdictions’ regulatory responses. Finally, unilateral standards become global standards only when the benefits of adhering to a single global standard are greater than the benefits of taking advantage of laxer standards in lenient jurisdictions—in other words, when a target’s conduct or production is non-divisible across global markets. All of these five elements are needed for the Brussels Effect to occur. Some of these conditions, such as market size, are rooted in jurisdictions’ historical endowments and less dependent on decisions made by either political institutions or market participants. Regulatory capacity and the willingness to promulgate stringent rules typically reflect the political economy in the regulating jurisdictions and are therefore a function of the affirmative choices made by political institutions. Further, inelasticity of regulatory targets or non-divisibility of regulations are conditions embedded in the nature of the global economy. They are driven by the business considerations of private companies, leaving them largely outside the influence of regulators themselves. This suggests that the Brussels Effect emanates as a result of a combination of bestowed market size, political decision-making, and market forces that drive corporate behavior. These five elements underlying the Brussels Effect are generic conditions for unilateral regulatory power, capable of explaining any jurisdiction’s ability (or inability) to regulate global markets alone. Yet this chapter shows how the EU is currently the predominant regulatory regime where these conditions exist, explaining why the EU—and not, for example, the United States—wields unilateral influence across a number of policy areas.

**The EU solves globally better than the U.S.**

**Bradford 20**, the Henry L. Moses Distinguished Professor of Law and International Organization at the Columbia Law School. (Anu, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World, pp. xv)

By providing both a theoretical and empirical account of the EU’s unilateral regulatory power, this book provides a corrective to the current discourse that portrays the EU as a weak and declining power. The goal of this book is not to deny the various criticisms of the EU’s weaknesses or argue that such criticism lacks merit. The goal is to show that the full story is much more balanced, and that in some very fundamental ways, the EU remains a powerful actor in the global economy. In addition, this book also challenges the prevailing narrative that views the EU as a champion of multilateral cooperation and universal norms,8 painting a stark contrast with the United States’ unilateralism in international affairs. The Brussels Effect shows that the EU’s commitment to multilateralism and universalism must be qualified. Like any great power, the EU is willing to shape the international order to ensure that international norms reflect its regulatory preferences—often multilaterally but at times even more effectively unilaterally.9 The United States is also typically associated with the pro-market views while the EU is seen as distrusting the markets and relying on government institutions instead. However, through the Brussels Effect, it is the EU, and not the United States, which best deploys the market forces to unleash its unilateral global regulatory power. Consequently, this book demonstrates that the EU’s greatest global influence may not be through multilateral mechanisms and political institutions, but instead through unilateral actions, facilitated by markets and private corporations.

**1NC/2NC --- NATO-EU Coop Impact**

**EU-NATO fusion solves climate change adaptation, disease, and contains food wars**

**Drozdiak 15** (William Drozdiak – Nonresident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution at the Center for the United States and Europe, worked for two decades as an Editor and Foreign Correspondent for The Washington Post, master’s degree at the College of Europe in Bruges and studied at the Institute of European Studies at the University of Brussels. <KEN> "Why can’t NATO and the EU just get along?," Brookings. September 2015. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/09/28/why-cant-nato-and-the-eu-just-get-along/)

For anybody who spends time in Brussels, one of the more baffling mysteries in the self-styled “capital of Europe” is the **lack of communication** between the **N**orth **A**tlantic **T**reaty **O**rganization and the **E**uropean **U**nion. Even though these vital Western institutions are located just a few miles from each other, there is a **striking absence** of policy coordination between them. This, at a time when the European continent is confronting **multiple crises** whose solutions will require **ingenuity**, innovative thinking, and **smarter use of resources**. HAPPIER TOGETHER The need for closer collaboration between the EU and NATO makes sense for several reasons. There is now greater overlap in membership than ever before—22 out of 28 NATO countries also belong to the EU. European allies are worried about an American retreat and want to see a reinvigorated U.S. commitment to their security. In fortifying ties between the two organizations, Europe could be reassured by an abiding American involvement on their continent. And deeper bonds between NATO and the EU could have tangible political benefits, perhaps even to help persuade Britain to stay in the EU. For the United States, this kind of initiative could **revitalize** the **transatlantic alliance** as the foundation of our political, security, and economic relations with the rest of the world. It could also demonstrate that the community of Western democracies still remains our front line in defending common values and interests in the 21st century. A new approach to Western security cooperation—starting by creating a joint policy planning council linking the EU and NATO—should extend beyond military thinking and pursue more imaginative responses to current threats. Those include hybrid warfare by Russia, surging **waves of refugees** from North Africa and the Middle East, pandemic **disease**, **climate change**, and **economic instability** on Europe’s periphery. Future security challenges will **demand** more **pluralistic policy responses** that could be best accomplished by **combining** NATO and EU **assets** and **capabilities**. In the fight against terrorism, NATO could work directly with the EU to connect national criminal databases and use the EU’s special powers to seize financial assets of suspected criminals. The EU and NATO should also collaborate to avoid conflict with Russia over the control of energy resources and shipping lanes through the Arctic region. The melting polar icecap will transform global shipping routes by shaving thousands of nautical miles and up to seven days of travel time off current itineraries through the Suez and Panama canals. For those reasons alone, it is imperative for the West to prevent Russian domination in the Arctic. Other regional challenges will require closer NATO and EU cooperation. The United Nations predicts the world will need **70 percent more food** to feed a global population of **9.6 billion** by 2050; some experts say at least **three dozen countries** could be **desperately short of crops** or **fresh water** within the next 10 years. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that by 2020, between 75 and **250 million** Africans could face **starvation** or **drought**—which could trigger new wars that might require **EU** and **NATO intervention**. GOOD FOR THE ECONOMY The United States and the European Union are now negotiating a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and hope to reach an accord next year. While there are many obstacles to an agreement, supporters believe that TTIP could help reaffirm Western leadership of the global economy and serve as a kind of “economic NATO” in which the West could set future standards for the rest of the world. Even today, in spite of the rise of China and India, trade and investment flows between Europe and North America account for nearly half of all global economic activity. A determined drive to bring down the Brussels Wall dividing NATO and the EU should accompany the push to reach a TTIP accord by the end of the Obama administration. Doing so could nurture a more rational division of labor between the two organizations. Today, member governments often send separate and sometimes contradictory instructions to their NATO and EU delegations. Such confusion can lead to chaotic policy responses, as seen in the way Germany, Hungary, Serbia, Croatia, and Austria seem to be working at cross-purposes in dealing with the tide of refugees crossing their borders. The failure to deal with this crisis has compounded earlier divisions between north and south during the eurocrisis and sapped much public enthusiasm for a more united Europe, in turn fueling a rise in support for populist demagogues who pose a threat to political stability. GOOD FOR SECURITY Russia’s aggressive behavior in eastern Ukraine and threats to destabilize other parts of Eastern Europe have infused new relevancy to NATO’s role. But as an institution bred with a Cold War mentality, NATO still remains much **too insular** and **dominated** by **rigid military perspectives** when the nature of today’s threats **require** economic, cybersecurity, health, and even social media considerations. In the case of Ukraine, Western countries decided early on that they were not prepared to risk a military confrontation with nuclear-armed Russia. In the absence of a military response, the United States and the European allies have invested their hopes in a set of economic sanctions to bring pressure to bear against Russia to seek a negotiated solution. The success of Western policy in Ukraine is more likely to hinge on how much financial support Europe and the United States can give Kiev, rather than NATO saber rattling. A **holistic policy approach** by the EU and NATO in dealing with all of these new security threats would **encourage greater contributions** from Western allies by drawing on a much **broader range of resources** from member governments to find **effective solutions**. By embarking on a **Copernican revolution** to reconsider how these Western institutions can achieve more **unified missions** would give both NATO and the EU a **new lease on life**.

**Refugees and food insecurity go nuclear**

**Cribb 10** (Julian Cribb – author, journalist, editor and science communicator. He is principal of Julian Cribb & Associates who provide specialist consultancy in the communication of science, agriculture, food, mining, energy and the environment. His career includes appointments as newspaper editor, scientific editor for The Pic credit: J. Carl Ganter Australian newspaper, director of national awareness for Australia’s science agency CSIRO, member of numerous scientific boards and advisory panels, and president of national professional bodies for agricultural journalism and science communication. His published work includes over 8000 articles, 3000 media releases and eight books. He has received 32 awards for journalism. His internationally-acclaimed book, The Coming Famine explores the question of whether we can feed humanity through the mid-century peak in numbers and food demand. <KEN> “The Coming Famine: The Global Food Crisis and what We Can Do to Avoid it,” University of Chicago Press. August 2010. https://books.google.com/books/about/The\_Coming\_Famine.html?id=Tv0zXxbQ7toC)

The Great Irish Famine may belong to the nineteenth century, but it carries undeniable messages for the twenty-first. It reveals the effect of overreliance on a major food source, and even though few countries today are as dependent on a single crop, many crops around the world are vulnerable to the loss of critical inputs such as water, fuel, or fertilizer, to disease, or to weather disaster. Any of these can unleash a local or regional famine—and the famine, in turn, will release an **outpouring of refugees**. In a world as heavily populated as ours, it is not hard to imagine how refugee tsunamis could result from a general food failure in the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia, China, sub-Saharan or North Africa, or Southeast or East Asia. Events of this scale are **beyond all previous human experience** for the simple reason that the world has never been so populous or its resources so fragile. The possibility of regional crises involving twenty, fifty, even as many as two hundred or **three hundred million refugees** must now be seriously contemplated. Such floods are unlikely to be stemmed by military force. They will alter the politics, demography, and culture of entire regions. They will change history. This is the most likely means by which the coming famine will affect all citizens of Earth, both through the direct consequences of refugee floods for receiving countries and through the effect on global food prices and the cost to public revenues of redressing the problem. Coupled with this is the risk of wars breaking out over local disputes about food, land, and water and the dangers that the **major military powers** may be sucked into these vortices, that smaller nations **newly nuclear-armed** may become embroiled, and that shock waves propagated by these conflicts will **jar the global economy** and **disrupt trade**, sending food prices into a fresh spiral. Indeed, an increasingly credible scenario for **World War** III is not so much a confrontation of superpowers and their allies as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts driven by the widening gap between food and energy supplies and peoples’ need to secure them. RISING THREATS Round the world, defense departments are already planning for what they anticipate as an era of rising instability and threats as populations swell, resources become scarcer, and climatic impacts hit home. Among the most notable examples is a U.K. Ministry of Defence Strategic Trends study that, among other insightful predictions, anticipated the collapse of global financial markets and the U.S. stock market by almost two years. Relevant findings from this report include: • increased risk of food price spikes and shortages, • water scarcities contributing to tensions in already volatile regions, • mass population displacement due to climate or resource scarcities, • possible collapse in fish stocks, • increased risk of development failure in some countries and “megacity failure,” and • greater societal conflict involving civil war, intercommunal violence, insurgency, pervasive criminality, and widespread disorder (see map 2).32 Another important report, this time from a U.S. perspective, is “The Age of Consequences.” This study explores the risks of a similarly destabilized world, erupting out of three different possible scenarios for climate change. Under the conservative scenario envisaged by the **I**ntergovernmental **P**anel on **C**limate **C**hange, this report anticipates “heightened **internal** and **cross-border tensions** caused by **large-scale migrations**; conflict sparked by resource scarcity, particularly in the weak and failing states of Africa.” Under severe climate change, it foresees that “the **internal cohesion** of nations will be **under great stress** . . . both as a result of a dramatic rise in **migration** and changes in **agricultural patterns** and **water availability**. The **flooding** of coastal communities around the world has the potential to challenge regional and even **national identities**. Armed conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is **likely** and **nuclear war** is possible.” The catastrophic scenario, the report simply says, “would pose almost inconceivable challenges as human society struggled to adapt,” adding, “**No precedent exists** for a disaster of this **magnitude**—one that affects **entire civilizations** in **multiple ways simultaneously**.”33

**EU-NATO cooperation caps every existential threat—hybrid war, refugees, disease, climate, econ, terror, Arctic war, food wars, populism.**

**Drozdiak 15** – (William Drozdiak is a Nonresident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, 9-28-2015, "Why can’t NATO and the EU just get along?," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/09/28/why-cant-nato-and-the-eu-just-get-along/)

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HAPPIER TOGETHER

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For the United States, this kind of initiative could revitalize the transatlantic alliance as the foundation of our **political**, **security**, and **economic relations** with the **rest of the world**. It could also demonstrate that the community of **Western democracies still remains our front line** in defending common values and interests in the 21st century.

A **new approach** to Western security **coop**eration—starting by creating a joint policy planning council linking the EU and NATO—should extend **beyond military thinking** and pursue more imaginative responses to **current threats**. Those include **hybrid war**fare by Russia, surging [**waves of refugees**](https://www.brookings.edu/2015/09/03/why-100000s-of-syrian-refugees-are-fleeing-to-europe/) from North Africa and the Middle East, **pandemic disease**, **climate change**, and [**economic instability**](https://www.brookings.edu/legacy/45B4C8F6-EDA4-483E-973F-3C6516242791) on Europe’s periphery.

Future security challenges will demand more **pluralistic policy** responses that could be best accomplished by **combining NATO and EU assets and capabilities**. In the fight against **terror**ism, NATO could work **directly** with the EU to **connect** national **criminal databases** and use the EU’s special powers to **seize financial assets** of suspected criminals.

The EU and NATO should also collaborate to avoid conflict with Russia over the control of energy resources and shipping lanes [through **the Arctic** region](https://www.brookings.edu/2015/08/27/russias-arctic-illusions/). The melting polar icecap will **transform global shipping routes** by shaving thousands of nautical miles and up to seven days of travel time off current itineraries through the Suez and Panama canals. For those reasons alone, it is imperative for the West to prevent Russian domination in the Arctic.

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GOOD FOR THE ECONOMY

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Such confusion can lead to chaotic policy responses, as seen in the way Germany, Hungary, Serbia, Croatia, and Austria seem to be working at cross-purposes in dealing with the tide of **refugees** crossing their borders. The **failure** to deal with this crisis has compounded earlier divisions between north and south during the eurocrisis and sapped much public enthusiasm for a more united Europe, in turn fueling a rise in support for **populist demagogues** who pose a threat to political stability.

GOOD FOR SECURITY

Russia’s aggressive behavior in eastern Ukraine and threats to destabilize other parts of Eastern Europe have **infused new relevancy** to NATO’s role. But as an institution bred with a Cold War mentality, NATO still remains much too insular and dominated by rigid **military perspectives** when the nature of today’s threats require **econ**omic, **cyber**security, health, and even social **media** considerations.

In the case of Ukraine, Western countries decided early on that they were not prepared to risk a military confrontation with nuclear-armed Russia. In the absence of a military response, the United States and the European allies have invested their hopes in a set of economic sanctions to bring pressure to bear against Russia to seek a negotiated solution. The **success** of Western policy in Ukraine is more likely to hinge on how much **financial support** Europe and the **U**nited **S**tates can give Kiev, rather than **NATO saber rattling**.

A **holistic policy approach** by the EU and NATO in dealing with all of these new security threats would encourage greater contributions from Western allies by drawing on a much **broader range** of resources from member governments to find effective solutions. By embarking on a Copernican revolution to reconsider how these Western institutions can achieve more unified missions would give both NATO and the EU a new lease on life.

**1NC/2NC --- EU Leadership Solves N/W**

**EU conflict mediation is an impact filter**

**Regan 16** (Seán O Regan, Master’s Degree in Commerce and Government from the University College Cork, Postgraduate Diploma in Conflict and Dispute Resolution from Trinity College, Dublin, Higher Diploma in Accounting, Business, Accounting, Tax, and Law from Dublin City University, “Conflict Resolution Revisited: Peaceful Resolution, Mediation and Responsibility to Protect”, All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, Volume 5, Issue 1, January, p. 70-73)

Thus, there is a well-rehearsed commitment to the principle of peace and by implication the peaceful resolution of disputes. The bipolar world order established after the Second World War made a mockery of this commitment. The term conflict prevention in this era meant **containing the potential for nuclear war between the major blocs**. The ideological struggle between those blocs was carried into **conflict all over the globe**, notably in **East Asia** (Korea and Vietnam), **Africa** (the Congo and Angola) and **Latin America** (Chile and Nicaragua). The international community’s response was generally to insert peacekeeping forces between parties in conflict without necessarily dealing with the **root causes** of the conflict. Many such conflicts ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but long-suppressed animosities between the constituent republics of that Union and its client states **erupted**. The international community’s failure to deal with the ethnic/sectarian conflicts in the **Caucasus** and **South Eastern Europe** on the one hand and the Rwanda genocide on the other impelled discussion of conflict prevention from academia to foreign policy formation. While the UN and the OSCE had long-standing commitments to conflict prevention, exercise of all possible options was in practice limited by international politics. When it became clear that, as Smith12 put it, the balance of terror of the Cold War would not be replaced by peace and security, the issue of conflict prevention became prominent for the international community. 3. Current Conflict Resolution Practice Van Waalraven13 explored the conflict policies of a sample of Western countries (Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) and found that general conflict policy, as against specific conflict intervention, was embedded in other, mainly development assistance, policies. He found it difficult to identify generic approaches to conflict prevention, although all countries examined used similar language in their descriptions of conflict and its causes, even if there was only vague consensus on what those causes are. The Council of the **E**uropean **U**nion, at its June 2001 meeting in Gothenburg,14 endorsed a programme of conflict prevention,15 stating this would “improve the Union’s capacity to undertake coherent early warning, analysis and action [to prevent conflict]” and that “[c] onflict prevention is one of the **main objectives** of the Union’s external relations and should be integrated in all its relevant aspects.” This document and the European Security Strategy16 provided the foundation for the elaboration of a whole series of policies, including the promotion of **mediation** in conflict prevention and resolution. It was followed in 2009 by the “Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities,”17 which uses the term mediation to encompass improved communication, negotiation, dialogue and facilitation through the offices of a third party, namely the EU. In this document mediation can be directive and coercive. It also notes the EU’s **financial power** and **moral authority** as **positive factors** in a **mediation** process.

**2NC --- AT Perm Both**

**EU unilateral action is key to soft power.**

**Bradford 20**, the Henry L. Moses Distinguished Professor of Law and International Organization at the Columbia Law School. (Anu, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World, pp. 24)

Finally, being able to set **norms** globally allows the EU to prove to its critics that it remains relevant as a global economic power. Embracing the role of a regulatory hegemon reinforces the EU’s identity and **enhances the EU’s global standing** even in the times of crises where its effectiveness and relevance are constantly being questioned. If the EU wants to exert influence, it must do so with the means available to it. Lacking traditional means of power, the EU’s greatest **global influence** is accomplished through the norms that it has the competence to promulgate. In the absence of military power or unconstrained economic power, the EU can exercise genuine **unilateral power** most effectively by fixing the standards of behavior for the rest of the world.80 In the world where the United States projects hard power through its military and engagement engagement in trade wars, and China economic power through its loans and investments, the EU exerts power through the most potent tool for global influence it has—regulation.

**Being the first mover on standard setting is key.**

**Miccoli 22**, Press Officer for internal market and industry at Spokesperson's Service, European Commission. (Frederica, New approach to enable global leadership of EU standards promoting values and a resilient, green and digital Single Market, <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_661>)

The fast pace of innovation, our green and digital ambitions and the implications of technological standards for our EU democratic values require an increasingly strategic approach to standardisation. The EU's ambitions towards a climate neutral, resilient and circular economy cannot be delivered without European standards. Having a strong global footprint in standardisation activities and leading the work in key international fora and institutions will be essential for the EU to remain a global **standard-setter**. By setting global standards, the EU **exports its values** while providing EU companies with an important **first-mover advantage**.

**EU independence from the US is key to solve our net benefit.**

**Dworkin, 18** -- ECFR senior policy fellow

[Anthony Dworkin, visiting lecturer in the Paris School of International Affairs, and Mark Leonard, co-founder and director of ECFR, "Can Europe save the world order?," European Council on Foreign Relations, 5-24-2018, https://ecfr.eu/publication/can\_europe\_save\_the\_world\_order/, accessed 2-24-2022]

To implement this agenda, the EU will need to overhaul its ways of working. Internally, it will need to find a method for operating with the flexibility and speed required for greater diplomatic engagement, while keeping the collective weight of the EU behind its initiatives. Coordinating EU efforts with the United Kingdom after Brexit will also be important. Externally, **the EU will need to** make an especially large investment in its relations with like-minded powers. Conversely, it will need to **develop a more independent posture towards the US**. The EU should continue to cooperate with the US wherever possible, but it should put its commitment to the rules-based order above its traditional instinct to follow the American lead. Some Europeans will worry that an independent and sometimes defiant attitude to the US will jeopardise the security relationship on which the EU continues to depend. But Trump has shown clearly that he does not reward concessions. Under his leadership, the United States’ security policy reflects its calculation of its own interests rather than any concern for repaying allies’ loyalty. The EU can **best manage** its relationship with the US and its support for **a rules-based international system** if it develops and **acts on a sense of itself as** an **independent** strategic actor. Europe needs to **set its own course** to secure the world order it wants.